Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC

-Written By Khushi Sheikh

1. Introduction

This legal matter revolves around the issuance of a temporary injunction, delving into the court's prerogative to grant such relief while also exploring the nuanced powers wielded by the court to prescribe specific terms and conditions. This aspect of the case underscores the inherently equitable nature of the relief sought and granted. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief.[1]

There are two types of injunctions: Temporary Injunction and Permanent/Perpetual Injunction. A Perpetual injunction is only granted through a final decree at the hearing and based on the merits of the suit. Consequently, the party is restrained from an act indefinitely. On the other hand, a temporary or interim injunction is granted through an interlocutory application at any stage of a suit. This injunction is termed temporary as it remains in effect until the suit is disposed of or until the court issues further orders.

A Temporary Injunction serves as a provisional remedy, aiming to preserve the subject matter in its current state, primarily to provide immediate relief. Sections 94(c) and 94(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, mention supplemental proceedings, allowing courts to prevent the defeat of justice. These sections authorize the court to grant a temporary injunction or make an interlocutory order deemed just and convenient. In case of disobedience, the court may compel the guilty party to civil prison and order the attachment and sale of their property. Section 95 of the same Act outlines provisions for awarding reasonable compensation to the defendant if insufficient grounds are found for the granted injunction or if the plaintiff is unsuccessful in the lawsuit.

In this case, the court discerned that the expressions 'prima facie cases,' 'balance of convenience,' and 'irreparable loss' are not merely rhetorical; rather, they bear substantive significance and are pivotal in the legal analysis undertaken.

2. Facts of the case

In this multifaceted legal saga, a quartet of litigations was initiated under Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. The narrative unfolds on June 14, 1979, when Dalpat Kumar, the appellant, entered into an agreement with Prahlad Singh, the respondent, for the acquisition of a residential house in Jaipur, commanding a consideration of Rs. 51,000. Subsequently, the appellant initiated a suit for specific performance.

On April 28, 1984, the spouse of the respondent initiated a suit seeking a temporary injunction to prevent dispossession from the said residential abode. Although the trial court initially rejected the appellant's suit for ad interim injunction in May 1984, this decision was upheld by the High Court on appeal on July 14, 1987.

The legal odyssey continued with the respondent's sons asserting joint ownership of the residential property, disavowing its sale as binding upon them, and subsequently demanding partition. Simultaneously, they sought an interim injunction, a plea dismissed by the High Court on July 7, 1988.

A fresh legal entanglement unfolded on December 7, 1988, when the respondent filed the fourth litigation, alleging fraud by the first appellant. Concomitantly, he sought an interim injunction to forestall dispossession from the residential dwelling. In a consequential ruling on February 26, 1991, the High Court granted the interim injunction, thereby restraining the appellants from assuming possession of the residential house.

3. Legal issue

Did the High Court have the authority to grant an ad-interim injunction, whether to the parties or the respondent, to prevent the dispossession of the property?

4. Analysis

In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court delineated three crucial prerequisites for granting a temporary injunction: prima facie merit, a balance of convenience, and the existence of irreparable harm. According to Order 39, Rule 1(c) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), an injunction is defined as a judicial remedy restraining one party from a particular action or compelling them to refrain from a specific activity. It serves as a preventive measure against potential future harm and is considered a form of preventive relief for litigants.

The court's authority to grant an injunction is discretionary and can be exercised when:

1. There is a seriously contested issue to be tried in court, with a likelihood of the plaintiff or defendant being entitled to the sought relief.

2. Court intervention is necessary to prevent potential future harm or protect a party from injury before the legal right is established at trial, resulting in irreparable loss or injury.

3. The harm or inconvenience likely to result from withholding the injunction is greater than that caused by granting it.

The condition for granting a temporary injunction requires the existence of a prima facie right and an infringement of the enjoyment of one's property or right. It's crucial to note that a prima facie case is distinct from a prima facie trial, as the former is established based on trial evidence. Satisfaction of a prima facie case alone is insufficient for injunction; the court must also ensure irreparable injury and a balance of convenience.

Irreparable injury, in this context, implies material harm that cannot be adequately compensated through compensation. The third condition for a temporary injunction is the balance of convenience.

The court must exercise sound judicial discretion in granting or denying injunctions, considering the potential harm or injury caused by the parties. While the court may have granted an ad-interim injunction in a prior case involving fraud, it should carefully assess the circumstances, parties' conduct, and the possibility of adequate compensation if the injunction is denied.

The court emphasized that any alienation during the court proceedings would be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, affirming the trial court's decision. It concluded that the respondent lacked valid grounds for the injunction, and the appellant did not engage in fraud; the contract was valid with proper consideration. The Supreme Court directed each party to bear its own costs, highlighting that the High Court hastily granted the injunction without due consideration of relevant provisions and principles.

5.Judgement of the court

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court, without considering material circumstances, evidence, or any alienation, erroneously favored granting the injunction based on the balance of convenience. Consequently, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court order and upheld the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court's grant of the temporary injunction to the respondent failed to align with the comprehensive provisions and principles outlined in Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code.